“PROXY
Governance
believes that the company is at a crossroads in its development,
and we
share the dissident's concerns regarding the ability and willingness
of
the board to undertake a comprehensive review of the company's
strategic
options. Furthermore, in view of the fact that the current board
was
formed in connection with the company's 2001 financial restructuring
and
in consultation with the company's lenders, and that the company
has
changed substantially since that time, we believe that it would
be
appropriate to bring on new board members to reflect the company's
current
position. We
believe that Wynnefield's nominees will bring diversity and fresh
thinking
to the board and, as such, we support their election”
(emphasis added).
|
“Given
that the board and CEO have tenure of 6 years (the length of this
restructuring process), and given the significant valuation and
performance gap versus comparables, we
believe the inclusion of one dissident nominee at the board would
add
value to deliberations on strategic alternatives,
while not being disruptive to the board functioning. As such, we
recommend
shareholders support dissident nominee Frederick G. Wasserman” (emphasis
added).
|
“Overall,
we believe that there
is a performance gap that is not fully explained by the company’s
historical debt burden and market dynamics”
(emphasis added).
|
“It
is clear that the company is at an important state in its development
-
Wynnefield and the board each agree that the company’s improved financial
position affords new opportunities. However, it is unclear to us
the
extent to which the board has undertaken an objective and independent
review of these opportunities, and we
are concerned about the risks to shareholder value
from the company embarking on an acquisition-led strategy without
such an
evaluation. In particular, we
are troubled by the board’s unwillingness to hire a financial
advisor,
and we are concerned that this may reflect the influence that CEO
Randall
[Chestnut] holds over the board. Furthermore, given that the board
essentially dates from the company’s 2001 financing, we
feel it would be appropriate for the board to bring in new
members
to
reflect the company’s new capital structure” (emphasis
added).
|
“…
we question the need for the Company to engage in legal service
relationships with its directors. We
view such relationships as potentially creating conflicts for directors,
as they may be forced to weigh their own interests in relation
to
shareholder interests when making board decisions.
In addition, the Company’s decision regarding where to turn for the best
professional services may be compromised when doing business with
the law
firm of one of the Company’s directors. Mr. Fox also served as a member of
the compensation committee during the past fiscal year, which we
believe
should consist solely of independent directors” (emphasis
added).
|
“…
we are inclined to agree with the dissident that the board’s composition
should be changed to better reflect the interests of outside shareholders”
and
|
“Wynnefield
is a long-term investor in Crown Crafts and has previously demonstrated
the ability, and patience, to work with management in delivering
long-term
shareholder value. Wynnefield’s nominees, we believe will bring diversity
and fresh thinking to the board…”
(emphasis added).
|
MacKenzie
Partners, Inc.
|
(800)
322-2885 (Toll Free)
|
(212)
929-5500 (Call Collect)
|
|
Very
truly yours,
|
|
/s/
Nelson Obus
|
||
Nelson
Obus
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