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| John Dorman Mr. Dorman has held a wide range of senior level executive positions in both the technology and financial institution sectors over the past 25 years. Mr. Dorman is the former Chief Executive Officer and Director of Digital Insight Corporation, a company that provides online banking and electronic payment services to mid-market banks and credit unions. Mr. Dorman led Digital Insight through its incredible growth era, culminating in a very successful cash sale to Intuit Inc. for $1.35 billion. | ||
| Edward D. Horowitz Mr. Horowitz has over 30 years of executive level experience with roles as Chief Executive Officer of SES Americom, North Americas leading commercial satellite provider, and senior operating roles at Viacom Inc. and Citigroup Inc. Mr. Horowitz was recruited by Citigroups Chairman, John Reed, to serve as the Chairman of e-Citi and Executive Vice President of Citigroups Advanced Development unit, a position he held from January 1997 to July 2000. During his tenure at Citigroup, Mr. Horowitz was responsible for developing and deploying Citigroups technology infrastructure to place its products and services on the internet and other electronic platforms. | ||
| Bruce A. Jaffe Mr. Jaffe is a veteran software and internet executive with over 15 years of experience, particularly in dealing with the challenges faced by business-to-business-to-consumer (B2B2C) web based business models like Online Resources. Between June 1995 and February 2008, Mr. Jaffe was an executive at Microsoft Corporation where he helped shape corporate strategy and led the M&A and business development functions. From December 2005 until February 2008, Mr. Jaffe held the position of Corporate Vice President, Corporate Development at Microsoft Corporation, and from 2003 until December 2005, he was Corporate Vice President and Chief Financial Officer, MSN Division at Microsoft Corporation. |
1. | We are not interested in selling the Company. We are not interested in any transaction that does not fully value the Company, or prematurely detracts from full value realization. Unlike Mr. Lawlor and the rest of the board, we dont have unbridled optimism about the Companys future doing business as usual and without new views and skills in the board room. We do believe that there is further value to be realized, and for that reason have selected nominees that have the skills to effect long term improvements. Our independent nominees have a record of building companies. |
If all we wanted was a sale, we would have sold our preferred stock and common stock position directly to a strategic acquirer (for which interest has been expressed in the past). After all, our preferred contains significant corporate governance rights to the benefit of the holder (including controlling just about all financings for the Company) which is the key attribute of value. If our preferred and common stock position were held by a strategic acquirer, we believe it would be near impossible for the Company to conduct a fair sale process as few other strategic players would show up. Therefore, if all we wanted were a sale, we would just sell our position directly, and not waste our time and money on this process. Why is this so hard for Mr. Lawlor to understand? We own a lot of common stock approximately 3 million common shares and an option on about another 5 million through our preferred. We want growth in the common stock price like everyone else. In addition, we note that if the Companys board were to approve a sale, the final decision on whether to accept an offer rests solely with the shareholders. This idea of conflict is fiction. | |||
2. | Our Nominees have no preconceived agenda. During the earnings call, Mr. Lawlor stated that Tennenbaums nominees have endorsed clear positions on critical issues before having any conversations with anyone from the Company. Thats news to us, and a blatant misrepresentation of the truth. The longer this process endures, the more astounded we are on the lengths the Company is willing to go to bend reality. | ||
Our nominees met with Mr. Lawlor and two other board members last month to reacquaint Mr. Lawlor with our nominees, and to provide a forum for discussion about the business. Our nominees were directly asked in this meeting by Mr. Lawlor and the incumbent directors whether they had any preconceived notion about the direction of the business and whether they supported a sale. All three of our nominees clearly stated that they did not support a sale, had no preconceived agenda, and have a fiduciary duty to common shareholders. It is a disservice to all of us that Mr. Lawlor creates his own reality. Any shareholder is welcome to call our nominees directly and ask the same questions. | |||
3. | We believe that if our nominees are elected the Company will have a well functioning board with terrific debate and dialogue for everyones benefit. Why would an incumbent board and CEO intimidate common shareholders with the threat that if shareholders elect new directors, then the board would become balkanized? Doesnt this defeat the purpose of director elections? | ||
Basically, Mr. Lawlor is telling us that unless you elect the directors that he wants (so in our view he can continue to exercise almost exclusive control over the board and the Company), then he and the other directors will create a toxic board environment to the detriment of all common shareholders. In our view that is not the appropriate, professional, or right behavior for the CEO or any director of any public company. In fact it seems like a childish threat. |
I assure you there will be no balkanized board; there will be no factions; nor disruptive behavior. That is unacceptable. John Dorman, Ed Horowitz and Bruce Jaffe are all INDEPENDENT nominees and all understand their obligations to be productive contributing members in a board setting. The objective is to elect the best and brightest board members to help direct the Company. Why is this controversial? The board has one customer and its the common shareholder. If the common shareholders elect and support change, it is incumbent upon the CEO and the existing directors to welcome that change. | |||
You have my commitment that Bruce Jaffe, Ed Horowitz, John Dorman and I are committed to improving the corporate governance machinery, not limiting its function. I hope the incumbent directors that you have elected in the past abide by the same. | |||
4. | Our nominees are not going to limit the strategic runway of the Company. They are going to expand it. Why is it that Mr. Lawlor and his team continue to suggest that our nominees are going to limit the Companys strategy? This contest has nothing to do with limiting the Companys runway to execute. It has to do with improving board room talent to expand the Companys runway and increase the probability of success. | ||
We have not asked management or the board to proactively sell the Company. We want better performance, better governance and better checks and balances. Thats all. Why would we want to sell after listening to Company management explain to us on the earnings call that a sale price would only be worth $5 per share? Im not sure what frightened us more the reference to price of $5 per share or the explanation of the methodology used to derive that number. Our view of the Companys intrinsic value is substantially higher than managements. | |||
How can it be that our own management team doesnt seem to fully comprehend a valuation framework (prospective multiples v. LTM; exclusion of synergies; etc.), nor can it clearly articulate our intrinsic value during an investor call? If our management team is going to have an open discussion regarding the Companys intrinsic value as a takeover target, we believe it should factor in all of the synergy value that will be derived by a buyer and how that factors into their capacity to pay. | |||
5. | None of our nominees have any experience in the payments industry according to Mr. Lawlor. I suggest that all shareholders review the bios of our nominees and then compare those with managements slate and all of the existing incumbent directors. This is an enterprise software company whose revenue model is based on consumer adoption of web services. I have been on the board over two years, and I dont believe any of the incumbent directors has the relevant industry experience to help grow and improve the Companys business model. In our view this board unfortunately doesnt question Mr. Lawlor or his strategy. Instead, the board is entirely deferential: Its Matts Company"- the saying |
usually goes. No, its the shareholders company. Time for some new thinking and new behavior. |
Banking Bill Payment Revenue and Transaction Trends (Q1 07 - Q1 09) (1) |
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($ in millions, transactions in millions) |
Q1 07 | Q2 07 | Q3 07 | Q4 07 | 2007 | Q1 08 | Q2 08 | Q3 08 | Q4 08 | 2008 | Q1 09 | CAGR(2) | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Banking Bill Payment Revenue |
$ | 19.7 | $ | 20.2 | $ | 20.2 | $ | 20.2 | $ | 80.3 | $ | 19.7 | $ | 18.1 | $ | 18.4 | $ | 17.9 | $ | 74.1 | $ | 17.5 | -5.7 | % | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
Banking Bill Payment Transactions |
40.8 | 42.1 | 42.1 | 41.8 | 41.8 | 41.8 | 39.0 | 39.1 | 39.4 | 39.4 | 39.0 | -2.2 | % | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Banking Billpay Adoption Rate |
6.3 | % | 6.7 | % | 6.8 | % | 8.7 | % | 8.7 | % | 9.0 | % | 9.4 | % | 10.0 | % | 10.2 | % | 10.2 | % | 10.4 | % | na |
(1) | Source: ORCCs public filings and Yahoo finance stock data | |
(2) | Based on quarterly sequential growth decline. |